

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RAFAELA MALAVE,

Plaintiff,

-against-

JUDGE ROBERT ALLAN SCHWARTZ,

Defendant.

25-CV-2817 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, a resident of Queens, New York, filed this *pro se* judicial misconduct complaint against Justice Robert Allan Schwartz, a state-court judge in Nassau County, New York who is presiding over an action involving Plaintiff's husband. The Clerk's Office opened Plaintiff's submission as a new civil action. For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Under Section 1391(c), a "natural person" resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an "entity with the capacity to sue and be sued" resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is committing misconduct in her husband's case proceeding in state court in Nassau County. She does not plead the residence of Defendant, only asserting that the alleged events giving rise to her claims occurred in Nassau County, which is located in the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 112. Because it is unknown where Defendant resides, it is unclear whether venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in either this District or the Eastern District of New York. Even if the Court did assume that Defendant resides in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Nassau County, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. *See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.*, 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. Plaintiff resides in Queens County, which is not in this District.¹ The underlying events occurred in Nassau County, where Defendant is employed, and it is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be located there. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); *see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court.² A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this case in this court.

¹ This judicial district, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following New York State counties: New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan), Bronx (New York City Borough of the Bronx), Westchester, Dutchess, Rockland, Orange, Putnam, and Sullivan. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).

² Plaintiff did not submit an application for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppededge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 7, 2025
New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge